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What Happened to the Money? Everyone knows that the Inuit have a thousand, million, trillion words for snow but English did not have one to describe a tsunami. We can give a precise date when the word entered everyday language, not just English but many, many others: 26 December 2004.
The tsunami is an event that entered a global collective consciousness, and perhaps, conscience. In a world full of divisions, it generated a moment of human solidarity. Political leaders lagged behind, unable to appreciate the need that ordinary people, many themselves poor, felt to give help to others in need. More than £6 billion was raised worldwide for the largest relief operation in recorded history. What happened to the money? Recent evaluation reports on the response of the humanitarian agencies give some interesting insights. These evaluations were commissioned in a spirit of helping agencies to do better in future emergencies. While it is inevitable that mistakes will be highlighted, we must recognise the enormous success of the response. Despite predictions of a massive second wave of death due to disease, this did not occur, due mostly to the rapid response to the crisis. It should also not be forgotten that the most important part of the response was by the governments and the people of the countries concerned. Why was there such a massive global reaction? Videos of the wave, the water and the terror of the victims shown around the world, almost instantaneously, must have had an influence. We saw people saved, people lost. We saw the paraphernalia of life being caught up and swept away. We could recognise our friends, our loved ones, our possessions in that terrible mess. But it was worse even than we imagined. When you stand on the sandy shore in Tamil Nadu with nearly all the signs of the deluge gone, the coconut palms betray the event. The damage is clearly seen 20 metres high in the palms and you know that this was the wave of legends that will live for thousands of years. We were in Tamil Nadu to see the work of AVI partners in the damaged areas: ASSEFA working in 180 fishing villages on social and economic programmes; Ekta Parishad supporting children and women, farmers who had lost their land and landless labourers in rebuilding their local resources; CRUSADE helping to ensure that children can complete their education and meet their long-term needs. Much of what we saw was inspiring but we were concerned (angered would not be too strong a word) about the waste and lack of understanding of local communities by international agencies. We saw fibre glass fishing boats lined up, pristine, on a beach, clearly not being used. Each emblazoned along its length with the name of the donor (in this case the Lutheran Church). In another place, we heard from villagers of British aid agency workers constructing houses for themselves outside the village and never interacting with the locals, let alone responding to local perception of needs. We visited a fishing community that was rapidly developing a dependency culture; community members begging or attempting to negotiate more money and food (which was in plentiful supply). Yet only a year ago they had been a proud fishing community who would not beg for anything. We heard first-hand accounts of even worse. In Sri Lanka for example, buildings being built by one agency then demolished and rebuilt by another. Of agencies competing to show the world media what the world wanted to see: instant remedies. Were we being too harsh in our judgement? Without doubt the early stages of the relief operation were a success. Agencies reached two million people with emergency medicines, food, clothing and sanitation services: epidemics were prevented. Our concerns were with the longer term effects of a failure to pay sufficient attention to local situations. The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Initial Findings (www.tsunami-evaluation.org) provide some support for our feelings. · Lack of co-ordination meant that easily accessible areas had a surfeit of support while the less accessible suffered shortages (Finding 1). · ‘International agencies did not engage sufficiently with local actors, and assessed the skills of local actors relative to those of their own agency rather than in terms of skills appropriate to the local context’ (Finding 3). · ‘Agencies focus too much on promoting their brand and not enough on the needs of the affected populations. Agencies are still not transparent or accountable enough to the people they are trying to assist’ (Finding 5). · ‘The recovery phase is proving a bigger challenge than the relief phase’ (Finding 6). In Tamil Nadu ‘recovery’ is not sufficient. A large part of the devastation was the result of the wave hitting poverty stricken areas. The calamity has exposed even further the injustices visited on those living at the margins. Our Indian partners use long-term approaches to community development at village level: ASSEFA, for example, commits to working in a village for 15 years. They need more resources but we are not talking about a quick fix. The approach varies slightly between our partners but each takes a participatory approach, discussing with local communities the best steps to improve their lives. The community then acquires the skills, knowledge, experience and legal framework to independently sustain the project. The enormous sums of money donated immediately after the event were an immediate response to an immediate need. The relief agencies provided the practical response for us but we should not ignore the need for the less appealing long-term rehabilitation work. We must go beyond ‘recovery’ to address the poverty that exacerbates vulnerability to natural disasters. David Knock
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